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agencies. The armed forces will experience modest expansion in terms 
of personnel while concentrating on increasing professionalization. 
This will be achieved partly through cooperation and training with 
neighbouring countries as well as traditional partners like Australia, 
Great Britain and the United States. The major defence focus for 
Brunei is its vital maritime economic zones, home to lucrative offshore 
energy resources. Non-traditional security issues — including illegal 
immigration, smuggling and narcotics trafficking — are other issues 
the armed forces are tasked with addressing. As Bruneians enjoy a 
higher per capita income than their immediate neighbours, and have 
access to subsidized commodities like rice, sugar and petrol, there will 
be continual attempts to smuggle those items out. 
Internal security issues such as political opposition, civil unrest 
or religious and ethnic disturbances are absent in Brunei. Religious 
propagation and practice, and the strong adherence in the approved 
Suni tradition, provides the overarching influence for a society built 
on the Malay Islamic Monarchy ideology. For any disturbance to the 
status-quo there is always the Internal Security Act that can be used 
to punish or “rehabilitate” wrongdoers. 
As a small political unit sandwiched amongst larger neighbours, 
it is necessary for Brunei to integrate itself with the political and 
security policies of ASEAN, while maintaining its cherished bilateral 
and multilateral linkages outside the Association, including, for example, 
its long time ally Britain. ASEAN will be its major source of collective 
engagement as evidenced by the fact that Brunei was one of the first 
countries to ratify the ASEAN Charter barely three months after its 
signing at the 2007 Summit. Brunei will maintain its usual warm 
relations with its external partners, notably Malaysia and Singapore, 
and will settle its territorial disputes through diplomacy, even if this 
entails protracted negotiations.
Cambodia
Coming on the heels of an overwhelming National Assembly (NA) 
victory (90 out of 123 seats — an increase of 17 seats over 2003) in 
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CAMBODIA
Land Area: 181,040 sq. km.
Population: 14 million
Capital: Phnom Penh
Type of Government: Parliamentary democracy with 
constitutional monarch
Head of State: King Norodom Sihamoni
Prime Minister: Hun Sen
Next Election: January 2011 (Senate)
Currency Used: Riel
US$ exchange rate US$1 =  
on XX December 2008: 
the 27 July 2008 elections, the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) 
will govern Cambodia in the next five years with little-to-no-effective 
political opposition. The political landscape in 2009–10 is likely to be 
an extension of business as usual: the CPP will control a political 
system absent checks and balances with an increasingly marginalized 
free press; Prime Minister Hun Sen will continue to consolidate power 
politically and with the help of his 4,000 strong personal bodyguard 
unit, Brigade 70; and the opposition Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) will be 
further marginalized having increased its electoral margin by only two 
NA seats to twenty-six. Progress on the new government’s five-year 
plan — announced at the first cabinet meeting held on 26 September 
2008 — which includes the promotion of the rule of law, protection 
of human rights and democracy, and an increase in the effectiveness 
of public services, is unlikely to be impressive given the government’s 
long-standing record of poor governance and lack of political will. 
While double-digit economic growth in recent years may suggest 
the rise of developmental state, the government has little incentive to 
move forward on combating corruption and addressing civil service 
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reform given continued inflows of foreign aid and Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI), especially from South Korea and China. In particular, 
the ruling CPP’s commitment and capacity to address the effectiveness 
of public services — indeed national development itself — in the 
next two years are predicated on improvement in domestic revenues, 
especially tax revenues, which have stagnated despite tremendous 
growth since 2002. 
The average civil servant’s salary remains extremely low — less 
than garment workers who currently make a minimum of US$55 per 
month — and is insufficient to cover basic living expenses, forcing 
civil servants to moonlight or resort to corruption. But progress on 
the National Programme for Administrative Reform, approved by the 
government in 1999, has been rudderless given an entrenched patronage 
system that has permeated every aspect of the bureaucracy since its 
inception. Indeed, there is a general lack of incentive by the CPP 
to effect reforms as this would require it to dismantle the lucrative 
patronage system that has flourished in the last decade and a half.
The long-awaited anti-graft legislation has been in draft form for 
more than a decade and there is little indication that a meaningful 
and enforceable bill will be passed in 2009. Consequently, corruption, 
the canary in the mineshaft of effective governance in Cambodia, may 
in fact worsen in the short-to-medium term as FDI grows. In 2008, 
the country ranked 166th out of 180 on Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index, placing it in the bottom 10th percentile, 
but in 2005, the first year in which it was ranked, Cambodia was near 
the 18th percentile. Thus, perceptions of Cambodian corruption have 
worsened over the past three years.
Human rights concerns will continue to be a source of social 
instability in 2009–10 and a focal point of contention with the 
international community. The issue of land grabbing, whereby tycoons 
and government officials illegally expropriate public and private land, 
has long simmered. Due to the unprecedented increase in the value of 
real estate in Phnom Penh, Siem Reap (the gateway to Angkor Wat), 
and the coastal city of Sihanoukville, this trend will only increase in 
the foreseeable future. Hundreds if not thousands of peasants, some 
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travelling hundreds of kilometres by foot, have converged on Phnom 
Penh and the Prime Minister’s residence seeking redress. While Hun 
Sen has repeatedly and very publicly demanded that land grabbing 
cease, these activities have continued unabated. The capacity of the 
government to address the issue is questionable given a thoroughly 
captured judicial system and an environment of impunity for well-
connected elites. It is highly likely that land grabs will continue. 
The government’s commitment to improving human rights is 
questionable and will further generate contention with the international 
community. The September 2008 resignation of Yash Ghai, the UN’s 
special envoy for human rights to Cambodia, after three years of 
strained relations with Hun Sen, underscores the confrontational 
approach the government has taken towards the international body 
and NGOs over this issue. This relationship will most likely worsen 
in the next two years due to the government’s perennial desire to 
shutdown the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR). While it has agreed to retain the OHCHR for an additional 
year, the government may yet succeed in achieving its goal. 
As has been the case since Cambodia’s transition to a parliamentary 
democracy in 1993, the role of the opposition will remain nominal. 
With the implosion of the royalist Funcinpec Party which lost twenty-
four of its twenty-six NA seats, the SRP, led by the outspoken former 
Funcinpec Finance Minister Sam Rainsy, remains the primary bulwark 
against the CPP. But the SRP and other smaller opposition parties 
such as the Human Rights Party, which has three NA seats, have very 
little leverage in a political system dominated by Hun Sen’s CPP. A 
concentration in urban areas and a reliance on charismatic leaders 
rather than a coherent strategy impedes the opposition’s ability to 
garner widespread support. Tremendous gains by the CPP in Phnom 
Penh suggest the erosion of urban support for the SRP in the July 
2008 elections.
Several pressure points will prove a challenge for the ruling party 
in 2009. First, while border tensions with Thailand have provided a 
boost to the popularity of the CPP by inflaming nationalism, deteriorating 
relations with its neighbours does not serve the country’s interests 
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in the long term. Nationalism on both sides of the border over the 
disputed ownership of Preah Vihear temple and surrounding lands has 
the potential of escalating into armed conflict. The selection of Somchai 
Wongsawat as Thailand’s new Prime Minister and the potential for 
political stability in 2009 in Bangkok may serve to calm tensions. 
Second, unchecked inflation, officially 20.94 per cent between 
January and July 2008, in addition to a slowdown in the global 
economy, may trigger social instability. The price of rice has nearly 
doubled in the past year, and anecdotal reports suggest that villagers 
have had to ration their food supply and consume lower-grade food 
items. Moreover, with a predominantly young and restless workforce, 
a cooling economy and an inevitable slowdown garments and tourism 
— Cambodia’s top two sectors — may result in social unrest. It 
remains to be seen how the ruling CPP can adapt to these challenges 
in the coming years. 
Despite these challenges, one thing will remain constant: Hun 
Sen’s grip on power. Indeed, the strongman, who became the word’s 
youngest prime minister in 1985 at the age of 33, stated last year: 
“If I am still alive, I will continue to stand as a candidate until I 
am 90.” Short of a fundamental change in the political system such 
as regime change, unchecked social instability, or ill health, there is 
little doubt as to who will run Cambodia through 2010 and far beyond. 
As such, the prospects for political stability in Cambodia in the next 
two years are excellent.
Indonesia
In 2009 Indonesian politics will be dominated by parliamentary and 
presidential elections that will result in another coalition government 
though with a slightly different vote allocation among the leading parties. 
Two likely differences can be anticipated. First, the PDIP (Indonesian 
Democratic Party of Struggle), led by Megawati Soekarnoputri, may well 
replace Golkar, led by Jusuf Kalla, as the largest party in parliament 
(DPR). An indication for this was given by Golkar’s defeat in a number of 
polls in 2008 in regions that were formerly party strongholds. A second 
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